

An Interval-based SAT Modulo ODE Solver for Model Checking Nonlinear Hybrid Systems

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Abstract. This paper presents a bounded model checking (BMC) tool called `hydlogic` for hybrid systems. It translates a reachability problem of a nonlinear hybrid system into a predicate logic formula involving arithmetic constraints, and checks the satisfiability of the formula based on a satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) method. We tightly integrate (i) an incremental SAT solver to enumerate the possible sets of constraints and (ii) an interval-based solver for hybrid constraint systems (HCSs) to solve the constraints described in the formulas. The HCS solver verifies the occurrence of a discrete change by enclosing continuous states that may cause the discrete change by a set of boxes. We adopt the existence property of a unique solution in the boxes computed by the HCS solver as (i) a proof of the reachability of a model, and (ii) a guide in the over-approximation refinement procedure. Our `hydlogic` implementation successfully handled several examples including those with nonlinear constraints.

1 Introduction

One of the challenging problems in software verification is to design and analyse systems in which computer programs reliably interact with their physical environment [17]. Such systems are modeled as hybrid systems (Section 2.2) that consist of discrete and continuous changes over time. To develop reliable embedded controllers such as those for automobiles, we need to describe the specification as hybrid systems, and to prove the correctness of the systems. This paper is intended to construct a model checking tool for hybrid systems to verify the reachability to unsafe states. Tools for hybrid systems such as [10, 15, 5, 16] have difficulties in modeling and verification, especially when the models belong to the class of

nonlinear hybrid systems, where vector fields in the continuous state space or conditions for discrete changes are expressed by nonlinear constraints. Since the above tools take linear hybrid systems as inputs, users need to linearize a problem by hand for each instance.

In this paper, we propose a satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) framework for the bounded model checking (BMC) of nonlinear hybrid systems. In the BMC of hybrid systems, the bounded execution of a model is described by a predicate logic formula involving arithmetic constraints [1, 4, 3, 9]. Checking the satisfiability of the formula may become possible for systems that are too large for unbounded execution. An SMT solver enumerates propositional models of the formula using a SAT (propositional satisfiability) solver and then checks the consistency of these models by calling *theory solvers* that handle the conjunctions of arithmetic constraints. BMC for possibly nonlinear hybrid systems is simply encoded using formulas involving ordinary differential equations (ODEs) [3]. However, no existing implementations support nonlinear hybrid systems.

Due to the state space explosion in handling the continuous state space of hybrid systems, abstraction methods play a significant role in model checking. Techniques for over-approximating state space by a set of boxes (tuples of intervals) [15, 4, 3] and polytopes [5] have been developed. In this paper, we use interval arithmetic (Section 2.1) for rigorous over-approximation. As a theory solver, we adopt a technique for hybrid systems proposed in our previous work [11] that integrates an interval-based method for nonlinear ODEs [13] and an interval-based constraint programming framework [8]. These interval-based methods guarantee that computed intervals or boxes enclose the solutions of a given problem. Moreover, the interval Newton methods guarantee that a unique solution exists in the computed intervals or boxes.

More specifically, this paper presents a BMC tool for nonlinear hybrid systems called **hydlogic**.

- **hydlogic** encodes a hybrid system into a predicate logic formula involving ODEs (Section 3). We describe a phase of continuous changes between two discrete changes as a *hybrid constraint system* (HCS) (Section 2.3) [11].
- We propose a set of algorithms for checking the satisfiability of the encoded formula (Section 4). The algorithms work tightly with (i) a SAT solver that enumerates possible sets of constraints, and (ii) a theory solver based on the HCS solver that simulates a phase of continuous change, i.e., computation of an initial value problem based on interval arithmetic.
- In the proposed algorithms, the theory solver efficiently computes a set of boxes that enclose a counter-example by using the interval Newton method. Ordinary over-approximation methods do not necessarily guarantee that the computed enclosure contains a counter-example. In contrast, as a by-product of employing the interval Newton method, the HCS solver we adopt guarantees the existence of a unique solution in a result when the checking of certain conditions succeeds. This work focuses on the search of such sets of boxes in which a unique counter-example exists. When the algorithms fail to find such sets of boxes, we can still prove that the model has no counter-example by exhaustively searching the rest of the state space.

We have implemented the **hydlogic** tool (Section 5) and used it to analyze several examples including those with nonlinear constraints (Section 6).

1.1 Related Work

Eggers et al. [3] used an interval-based solver for ODEs in an SMT framework. However, their method did not support either nonlinear ODEs or nonlinear guard constraints which our method does. Their method was also limited in the integration with the SMT framework. The method collects ODEs and solves them in a round-robin manner. Our method solves ODEs incrementally while the SMT framework unrolls an execution path. To certify the result and to reduce the search space, our method utilizes the existence property of a unique solution obtained by the interval-based solver.

Ratschan et al. [15] proposed to translate a safety verification problem of a hybrid system into a constraint satisfaction problem. They also provided an interval-based implementation of the method that supports nonlinear constraints. Their method is not an SMT framework but is based on a specific set of complex constraints. Our method provides a simpler and more modular SMT framework that uses generic solvers for (nonlinear) equations and ODEs.

2 Preliminaries

This section introduces notions used for describing the technique we propose.

2.1 Interval Arithmetic

The proposed method is based on interval arithmetic [12]. A (bounded) *interval* $[l, u]$ ($l, u \in \mathbb{R}$) is a set of real numbers, where

$$[l, u] = \{r \in \mathbb{R} \mid l \leq r \leq u\}.$$

\mathbb{I} denotes a set of intervals. A *box* is a tuple (I_1, \dots, I_n) of n intervals. \mathbb{I}^n denotes a set of boxes. For an interval $I \in \mathbb{I}$, $\text{lb}(I)$ and $\text{ub}(I)$ denote the lower and upper bounds, respectively. For a tuple X , $X.i$ denotes the i -th component of X .

For $f : \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$, $F : \mathbb{I}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{I}^n$ is called an f 's *interval extension* iff it satisfies the following condition:

$$\forall I_1 \in \mathbb{I} \cdots \forall I_m \in \mathbb{I} \forall r_1 \in I_1 \cdots \forall r_m \in I_m \forall i \in \{1, \dots, n\} \\ [f(r_1, \dots, r_m).i \in F(I_1, \dots, I_m).i].$$

In the implementation of the proposed method, we use a machine-representable interval I such that $\text{lb}(I)$ and $\text{ub}(I)$ belong to a set of floating-point numbers $\mathbb{F} \subset \mathbb{R}$. In the computation of interval extensions, we handle the bounds of intervals rigorously to enclose the theoretical solutions and the accumulation of round-off errors.

2.2 Hybrid Systems

Hybrid systems are systems consisting of discrete changes and continuous changes over time. We consider a reachability problem that decides whether the execution of a hybrid system may reach (or never reach) an unsafe state that is predetermined by the users.

Definition 1. A *hybrid system* with unsafe states is a tuple $HS = (\mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{F}, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{R}, \text{Init}, \text{US})$ consisting of the following components:

- A finite set \mathcal{Q} of *discrete states*;
- A set $\mathcal{X} = \mathbb{R}^n$ of *continuous states*;
- A finite set $\mathcal{E} \subseteq \mathcal{Q} \times \mathcal{Q}$ of *discrete state transitions*;
- A family $\mathcal{F} = \{f_q\}_{q \in \mathcal{Q}}$ of *vector fields* $f_q : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$. We assume f_q is a Lipschitz continuous function;
- A family $\mathcal{I} = \{\text{Inv}_q\}_{q \in \mathcal{Q}}$ of *invariants* $\text{Inv}_q = I_1 \times \cdots \times I_n$, where $I_1, \dots, I_n \in \mathbb{I}$;
- A family $\mathcal{G} = \{g_e(x) = 0\}_{e \in \mathcal{E}}$ of *guard constraints*, where x is a variable over \mathcal{X} , and g_e is a differentiable function $\mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$;
- A family $\mathcal{R} = \{\text{rst}_e\}_{e \in \mathcal{E}}$ of (polynomial) *reset functions* $\text{rst}_e : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$;
- A set of *initial states* $\text{Init} = (q_0, I_1 \times \cdots \times I_n)$, where $q_0 \in \mathcal{Q}$ and $I_1, \dots, I_n \in \mathbb{I}$;
- A finite set $\text{US} \subseteq \mathcal{Q}$ of *unsafe states*. \square

A k -step *execution* of a hybrid system is an alternating sequence of *discrete change phases* (DPs) and *continuous change phases* (CPs)

$$\begin{array}{c} \xrightarrow{\text{DP}^0} (q^0, x^0, t^0) \xrightarrow{\text{CP}^0} (q^0, x^1, t^1) \xrightarrow{\text{DP}^1} \dots \\ \xrightarrow{\text{DP}^{k-1}} (q^{k-1}, x^{k-1}, t^{k-1}) \xrightarrow{\text{CP}^{k-1}} (q^{k-1}, x^k, t^k), \end{array}$$

where:

- $q^i \in \mathcal{Q}$, $x^i, x_{-}^{i+1} \in \mathcal{X}$, and $t^0, t^{i+1} \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ ($i \in \{0, \dots, k-1\}$);
- DP^0 stands for the establishment of an initial state $(q^0, x^0, t^0) \in \text{Init}$;
- For $i \in \{1, \dots, k-1\}$, DP^i is an (instant) state transition from $(q^i, x_{-}^{i+1}, t^{i+1})$ to $(q^{i+1}, x^{i+1}, t^{i+1})$ at time $t^{i+1} \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$, where $(q^i, q^{i+1}) \in \mathcal{E}$, $g_{(q^i, q^{i+1})}(x_{-}^{i+1}) = 0$, and $x^{i+1} = \text{rst}_{(q^i, q^{i+1})}(x_{-}^{i+1})$ hold;
- For $i \in \{0, \dots, k-1\}$, CP^i is a continuous evolution of states from $x^i \in \mathcal{X}$ to $x_{-}^{i+1} \in \mathcal{X}$ while a discrete state q^i is enabled.

Let $0 < t^0 < \dots < t^{k-1}$ be k time points, q^i a discrete state enabled over the time interval (t^i, t^{i+1}) , f_{q^i} a vector field corresponding to q^i , and $x^i \in \mathcal{X}$ a continuous state at time t^i . Then, a continuous function (or trajectory) $y : [t^i, t^{i+1}] \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ is determined with the ODE $\dot{y}(\tau) = f_{q^i}(y(\tau)) \wedge y(t^i) = x^i$, where $\dot{y}(\tau) = dy(\tau)/d\tau$. Since f_{q^i} is Lipschitz continuous, a unique trajectory is determined by the ODE. For all $t \in [t^i, t^{i+1}]$, $y(t) \in \text{Inv}_{q^i}$ holds. x_{-}^{i+1} is obtained as $y(t^{i+1})$. In the following, we call the pair $(\text{DP}^i, \text{CP}^i)$ the i -th *step* of an execution.

For a hybrid system, a state $q \in \mathcal{Q}$ is *reachable* within k steps if and only if there exists a k -step execution where $\exists i \in \{0, \dots, k-1\} [q_i = q]$. A hybrid system is *unsafe* (resp. *safe*) within k steps if and only if there exists a state $us \in \text{US}$ reachable (resp. unreachable) within k steps.

Example 1. We describe a controller that steers a car along a straight road near a canal [2]. Figure 1 shows the controller modeled as a hybrid system. The model consists of 7 discrete states corresponding to each node, 3-dimensional continuous states $(p, \gamma, c) \in \mathbb{R}^3$, and 9 discrete state transitions corresponding to each edge. Let p, γ , and c represent the horizontal position of the car, the heading angle, and the internal timer, respectively. A discrete state labeled `go_ahead` has a vector field $(-r \cdot \sin(\gamma), 0, 0)$ and an invariant $[-1, 1] \times [-\infty, \infty] \times [-\infty, \infty]$. The set of initial states is $(\text{go_ahead}, [-1, 1] \times [-\pi/4, \pi/4] \times [0])$. A transition e from `go_ahead` to `left_border` has a guard constraint $g_e(x) = p + 1 = 0$ and a reset function $\text{rst}_e(x) = (p, \gamma, 0)$ (x is a variable over \mathbb{R}^3). An edge entering `go_ahead` represents the initial constraint. Reaching the state labeled `in.canal` in an execution signals the unsafety of the model. \square




Fig. 1. Model of the car steering example.

2.3 Hybrid Constraint Systems

We formulated the problem of detecting a discrete change in hybrid systems as a hybrid constraint system, consisting of a flow constraint on trajectories and a guard constraint on states causing discrete changes [11]. The solution to such a system is the crossing point(s) of a trajectory and a boundary in the state space represented by a guard constraint.

Definition 2. A *hybrid constraint system (HCS)* is a tuple $HCS = (\tilde{x}, \text{flow}_q, \text{grd}_e, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{D}_0)$ with the following components:

- A tuple of variables $\tilde{x} = (x_0, x_1, \dots, x_n)$ consisting of a variable x_0 representing the time $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ at a crossing point and n variables x_1, \dots, x_n representing a continuous state in $\mathcal{X} = \mathbb{R}^n$ at time x_0 ;
- A *flow constraint* $\text{flow}_q(\tilde{x})$ corresponding to a discrete state $q \in \mathcal{Q}$, which is described by the conjunction of the four equations

$$\begin{aligned} \text{flow}_q(\tilde{x}) \equiv & \dot{y}(\tau) = f_q(y(\tau)) \wedge y(t_0) = y_0 \\ & \wedge y(x_0) = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \wedge x_0 > t_0, \end{aligned}$$

where $t_0 \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$, $y_0 \in \mathcal{X}$, $y(\tau)$ is a trajectory $[t_0, t_{max}] \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ ($[t_0, t_{max}] \in \mathbb{I}$);

- A *guard constraint* $\text{grd}_e(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ corresponding to a transition $e \in \mathcal{E}$ is described by

$$\text{grd}_e(x_1, \dots, x_n) \equiv g_e(x_1, \dots, x_n) = 0;$$

- A domain $\mathcal{D} = (D_0, \dots, D_n) \in \mathbb{I}^{n+1}$ that contains possible values of the variables;
- An initial value set $\mathcal{D}_0 = (D_{0,0}, \dots, D_{n,0}) \in \mathbb{I}^{n+1}$ that contains values for parameters t_0 and y_0 in flow_q . \square

The *valuation* of an HCS is a map of the form $\tilde{x} \mapsto (d_0, \dots, d_n)$ from every variable $x_i = \tilde{x}.(i+1)$ to a value

$d_i \in D_i$. A *solution* of the HCS is a valuation satisfying the constraints $flow_q$ and $grad_e$. An HCS may have multiple solutions.

In [11], we proposed a technique for solving HCSs by coordinating (i) interval-based solving of nonlinear ODEs and (ii) a constraint programming technique for reducing interval enclosures of solutions. Our technique provides the following characteristics: (a) the computation is regarded as a contracting map $S_{HCS} : \mathbb{I}^{n+1} \rightarrow 2^{\mathbb{I}^{n+1}}$, where $\forall \mathcal{D}' \in S_{HCS}(\mathcal{D})[\mathcal{D}' \subseteq \mathcal{D}]$; (b) the domain $\mathcal{D}' \in S_{HCS}(\mathcal{D})$ is *box-consistent*, i.e., for each bound b of a component D_i of \mathcal{D}' , interval-based computation of constraints with a valuation $\tilde{x} \mapsto (D_0, \dots, [b], \dots, D_n)$ encloses a solution of the HCS.

The interval Newton method used in S_{HCS} guarantees the existence property of computed intervals. S_{HCS} checks certain conditions when applying the interval Newton method, and if the conditions hold, it guarantees that a unique solution exists in the computed domain for each value in the initial domain \mathcal{D}_0 .

Example 2. Consider an execution in the discrete state $q = \text{go_ahead} \in \mathcal{Q}$ of the model in Example 1, which will move to the state left_border with $e = (\text{go_ahead}, \text{left_border}) \in \mathcal{E}$. We can express the continuous state in q causing a discrete change with respect to e by an HCS consisting of the following components:

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{x} &= (t, p, \gamma, c), \\ flow_q(\tilde{x}) &\equiv \dot{y}(\tau) = (-r \cdot \sin(y(\tau).3), 0, 0) \\ &\quad \wedge y(t_0) = y_0 \wedge y(t) = (p, \gamma, c) \wedge t > t_0, \\ grad_e(p, \gamma, c) &\equiv p + 1 = 0, \\ \mathcal{D} &= (\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}, [-1, 1], \mathbb{R}, \mathbb{R}), \\ \mathcal{D}_0 &= ([0], [-1, 1], [-\pi/4, \pi/4], [0]). \end{aligned}$$

The flow constraint $flow_q$ is parametrized by variables t_0 and y_0 that range over $[0]$ and $[-1, 1] \times [-\pi/4, \pi/4] \times [0]$, respectively. \square

3 Constraint-based Representation of Hybrid Systems

We describe hybrid systems involving unsafe states as predicate logic formulas with flow and guard constraints described in Section 2.3. We propose how a reachability problem of a hybrid system is translated into satisfiability checking of a formula. This encoding method is a modification of the former methods [1, 3].

Definition 3. A k -step execution of HS is encoded as a formula $\llbracket HS \rrbracket^k$ as follows.

1. Prepare the following variables:
 - $(k+1)$ Boolean variables b_q^i ($i \in \{0, \dots, k\}$) for each discrete state $q \in \mathcal{Q}$ representing whether the state is activated in the i -th step;

- k Boolean variables b_e^i ($i \in \{0, \dots, k-1\}$) for each discrete state transition $e \in \mathcal{E}$ representing the activation of the transition;
 - $(k+1)$ variables x^i ($i \in \{0, \dots, k\}$) and k variables x_-^i ($i \in \{1, \dots, k\}$) over n -real vectors representing the continuous state after the i -th transition and before the $(i+1)$ -st transition, respectively;
 - k variables t^i over $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ ($i \in \{0, \dots, k-1\}$) representing the time at which the i -th transition takes place;
 - k variables x_{inv}^i over n -dimensional real vectors and k variables t_{inv} over $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ ($i \in \{0, \dots, k-1\}$).
2. The following formulas express that a unique discrete state is activated and a unique transition takes place in the i -th step

$$UQ^i = \bigotimes_{q \in \mathcal{Q}} b_q^i, \quad UE^i = \bigotimes_{e \in \mathcal{E}} b_e^i,$$

where \otimes means that exactly one of the arguments is true.

3. The following formula expresses the CP corresponding to the discrete state q in the i -th step

$$CONT^i = \bigwedge_{q \in \mathcal{Q}} (b_q^i \Rightarrow flow_q^i(t^{i+1}, x_-^{i+1})).$$

The invariant in the i -th step is described through the following formula

$$\begin{aligned} INV^i &= (flow_q^i(t_{inv}^i, x_{inv}^i) \wedge t^i \leq t_{inv}^i \leq t^{i+1} \\ &\quad \wedge x_{inv}^i \notin Inv_q) \Rightarrow \neg b_q^i. \end{aligned}$$

4. Taking a discrete state transition $e = (q, q') \in \mathcal{E}$ at step i implies enabling the discrete states q at step i and q' at step $i+1$. Moreover, the guard constraint should be satisfied by x_-^i , and the initial state x^{i+1} for the next step is determined by the reset function. For transitions in \mathcal{E} , we describe the following formulas

$$\begin{aligned} EDGE^i &= \bigwedge_{e=(q,q') \in \mathcal{E}} (b_e^i \Rightarrow (b_q^i \wedge b_{q'}^{i+1})), \\ TRANS^i &= EDGE^i \wedge \bigwedge_{e \in \mathcal{E}} (b_e^i \Rightarrow (grad_e(x_-^i) \\ &\quad \wedge x^{i+1} = rst_e(x_-^i))). \end{aligned}$$

5. Let q be a discrete state specified in *Init.1*. The initial state is described by the following formula

$$INIT = b_q^0 \wedge x^0 \in \text{Init.2}.$$

6. Finally, conjunct all the formulas described above. We also express that the unsafety (to be falsified in model checking) holds. In this paper, unsafety properties are represented as discrete states $US \subseteq \mathcal{Q}$ in a model. For each variable b_{us}^i corresponding to

$us \in US$, we express that us will be reached within the k -step execution

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket HS \rrbracket^k = & INIT \wedge \bigwedge_{i=0}^{k-1} (UQ^i \wedge UE^i \wedge CONT^i \wedge INV^i \\ & \wedge TRANS^i) \wedge UQ^k \wedge \bigvee_{i=0}^k \bigvee_{us \in US} b_{us}^i. \quad \square \end{aligned}$$

Proposition 1. *For a hybrid system HS , suppose $\llbracket HS \rrbracket^k$ is a formula encoded for k steps as described above. If $\llbracket HS \rrbracket^k$ is unsatisfiable, then HS is safe for its k -step execution. \square*

4 Algorithms for Checking the Satisfiability

In this section, we propose a set of algorithms for checking the satisfiability of the formula $\llbracket HS \rrbracket^k$ described in Section 3. We use interval-based techniques to deduce the satisfiability of constraints in a formula by computing a set of boxes that may enclose the solution of the constraints. As in DPLL(T) [6], we tightly integrate a modern SAT solver and a theory solver, i.e., the HCS solver described in Section 2.3. Our method incrementally runs a SAT solver, for each step, to enumerate combinations of active constraints in a formula, such as the discrete state to enable in the current step, the flow constraint in the discrete state, and the guard constraint for a possible transition from the current state. Then, the interval-based HCS solver computes an enclosure of states causing the next discrete change. With this result, the algorithms check the consistency of the set of constraints for the current step.

As in the previous work [2, 15, 4, 3], we refine an over-approximation of continuous changes in a solving process to obtain a more accurate enclosure. Refinements are done by splitting one of the components of an initial boxed value. The refined initial values are enumerated by the SAT solver. In our method, refinements are guided by whether computed intervals are proved to enclose a unique solution, or whether by or an initial interval value is precise enough.

4.1 Incremental Solving

The INCSOLVE algorithm illustrated in Figure 2 checks the satisfiability of the formula $\llbracket HS \rrbracket^k$. Input to the algorithm is a hybrid system with unsafe states HS , and a maximum number of steps $k \in \mathbb{N}$ to verify. The algorithm returns one of the following values: **Sat** (satisfiable); **Unsat** (unsatisfiable); **Unknown** indicating that it cannot be decided whether the formula is satisfiable or not (due to the too coarse initial condition). When **Sat** is returned, the existence of a counter-example, which signals the unsafety of the systems, is guaranteed.

At lines 1–2, the algorithm translates HS into $\llbracket HS \rrbracket^k$ and reads the subformula $Init$ describing the initial states into the proposition database P (P is always modified by appending formulas). When reading a predicate logic formula lf , the algorithm first translates lf into a propositional logic formula bf by mapping each constraint in lf to a propositional variable (these maps are preserved in a table), and then substitutes bf into P . A flag uk initialized in line 3 indicates whether the satisfiability of the formula can be decidable or not.

In the loop starting from line 5, the algorithm incrementally checks the satisfiability of $\llbracket HS \rrbracket^i$ for $i \in \{0, \dots, k-1\}$. At line 6, the subformulas UQ^i , $CONT^i$, INV^i , and $EDGE^i$ are read. Then the SAT solver processes the proposition P and computes a valuation for the propositional variables within them (lines 7–10). If there is no valuation, the algorithm terminates and returns **Unknown** or **Unsat**. Note that $TRANS^i$ is not handled here. The algorithm returns **Sat** if the current discrete state is unsafe (line 12).

The decision of a transition $e \in \mathcal{E}$ to take place is computed in the HCSPROPAG procedure described in the next section (line 14). For each $e \in \mathcal{E}$ from the state q^i , HCSPROPAG checks whether the transition will be enabled or not, and returns the result res_e of the check, a reachable continuous state \mathcal{D}_e that is consistent with the guard constraint grd_e , and the next discrete state q_e to proceed to. At lines 15–25, the algorithm analyzes the results. When the box \mathcal{D}_e is guaranteed to contain a unique solution of grd_e , the algorithm learns an initial condition for the next step and proceeds to the next loop (line 17). When grd_e is unsatisfiable, the algorithm learns that it does not need to re-check this transition in the sequel (line 20). This is effective when the algorithm refines the initial domain and re-simulates the execution from the domain. Otherwise, grd_e may be satisfied or may not. Thus, the algorithm tries to refine the initial domain (see Section 4.3) at line 23. If it cannot be refined, i.e., the initial domain is too coarse to divide, the algorithm turns on the flag uk . If there is no possible transition, the algorithm returns **Unknown** or **Unsat** (line 27).

4.2 Propagation by Solving HCSs

The HCSPROPAG algorithm (Figure 3) computes a continuous state evolution simultaneously evaluating the guard constraints to determine the next transition to take place. This is done by constructing an HCS for each candidate transition, and solving it with the method described in Section 2.3. The procedure is equivalent to *theory propagation* in DPLL(T). The input consists of a set \mathcal{E} of candidate transitions, an initial domain \mathcal{D}_0 for the HCS, a flow constraint $flow_q$ for the current step, and an invariant Inv_q .

The destination state q_e and the guard constraint grd_e are given by a transition $e \in \mathcal{E}$ (line 3). At line

Input: a hybrid system HS , and a maximum step k
Output: satisfiability $sat \in \{\text{Sat}, \text{Unsat}, \text{Unknown}\}$

```

1: encode  $HS$  to obtain  $[HS]^k$ 
2:  $P := \text{INIT}$ 
3:  $uk := \text{false}$ 
4:  $i := 0$ 
5: while  $0 \leq i \leq k-1$  do
6:    $P := P \wedge (UQ^i \wedge UE^i \wedge CONT^i \wedge INV^i \wedge EDGE^i)$ 
7:    $sat := \text{SOLVE}(P)$ 
8:   if  $\neg sat$  then
9:     return  $uk ? \text{Unknown} : \text{Unsat}$ 
10:   $(q^i, \mathcal{D}_0^i, flow_{q^i}^i, Inv_{q^i}) :=$ 
11:  collect true-valued constraints from  $P$ 
12:  if  $q^i \in US$  then
13:    return  $\text{Sat}$ 
14:   $\mathcal{E}' := \{(q, q') \in \mathcal{E} \mid q = q^i\}$ 
15:   $\{(res_e, \mathcal{D}_e, q_e)\}_{e \in \mathcal{E}'} :=$ 
16:   $\text{HCSPROPAG}(\mathcal{E}', \mathcal{D}_0^i, flow_{q^i}^i, Inv_{q^i})$ 
17:  for  $e \in \mathcal{E}'$  do
18:    if  $res_e = \text{true}$  then
19:       $P := P \wedge ((q^{i+1} = q_e) \Rightarrow (x^{i+1} \in Rst_e(\mathcal{D}_e)))$ 
20:    else
21:      if  $\mathcal{D}_e = \emptyset$  then
22:         $P := P \wedge (\neg e)$ 
23:      else
24:        if  $\neg$  (the initial domain is precise enough)
25:        then
26:           $P := \text{REFINE}(P); i := 0; \text{CONTINUE}()$ 
27:        else
28:           $uk := \text{true}; P := P \wedge (\neg e)$ 
29:         $i := i + 1$ 
30:  return  $uk ? \text{Unknown} : \text{Unsat}$ 

```

Fig. 2. INCSOLVE algorithm.

4, an initial domain is prepared by setting a maximum time interval beyond the initial time and the invariant box for the current state.

An HCS is solved at line 5 and a set of box-consistent domains are obtained as a result. Domains in the set are enumerated at lines 6–13. As described in Section 2.3, the S_{HCS} we adopt may guarantee that a resulting domain contains a unique solution with respect to every initial value in \mathcal{D}_0 . The algorithm returns *true* if the existence of a solution is guaranteed, or *false* otherwise.

4.3 Over-approximation Refinement

The REFINE procedure called in INCSOLVE tries to refine an over-approximation by dividing the initial box and re-computing the over-approximation for each of the divided boxes. In a refinement, an initial box is divided along one of the components of the box (each time the component is changed in a round-robin manner). Each time an initial box is refined, the solver learns an additional formula on the initial constraint. In the formula, we use Boolean variables id_i ($i \in \mathbb{N}$) which give an identifier to each initial box. Beforehand, we give id_0 to *INIT* by adding the formula $id_0 \Leftrightarrow \text{INIT}$ to the proposition

Input: a set \mathcal{E} of transitions, an initial domain \mathcal{D}_0 , a flow constraint $flow_q$, and an invariant Inv_q
Output: a set R of tuples (res, \mathcal{D}, q) , where $res \in \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$, $\mathcal{D} \subseteq \mathcal{X}$, and $q \in \mathcal{Q}$

```

1:  $R := \emptyset$ 
2: for  $e \in \mathcal{E}$  do
3:    $(q_e, grd_e) :=$  collect the destination state and the
4:   guard constraint of  $e$ 
5:    $\mathcal{D} := (\mathcal{D}_0, \dots, \mathcal{D}_n)$ , where  $\mathcal{D}_0 = [\text{lb}(\mathcal{D}_0.1), t_{max}]$  and
6:    $\mathcal{D}_1 \times \dots \times \mathcal{D}_n = Inv_{q_e}$ 
7:    $DS := S_{HCS}(\mathcal{D})$ , // see Section 2.3
8:   where  $HCS = (\tilde{x}, flow_q, grd_e, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{D}_0)$ 
9:   if  $DS = \emptyset$  then
10:      $R := R \cup \{\text{false}, \emptyset, q_e\}$ 
11:   else
12:     for  $\mathcal{D} \in DS$  do
13:       if  $\mathcal{D}$  is proved to contain a solution then
14:          $R := R \cup \{\text{true}, \mathcal{D}, q_e\}$ 
15:       else
16:          $R := R \cup \{\text{false}, \mathcal{D}, q_e\}$ 
17:   return  $R$ 

```

Fig. 3. HCSPROPAG algorithm.

database P . Let \mathcal{D}_0 be an initial boxed value, and assume that \mathcal{D}_0 is divided into boxes $\mathcal{D}_{0,1}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{0,2}$. Then, we construct the following formula and add this to the solver.

$$((id_0 \wedge q^{i+1}) \Rightarrow (id_1 \oplus id_2)) \wedge (\neg id_1 \vee \neg id_2) \\ \wedge (id_1 \Rightarrow (x^0 \in \mathcal{D}_{0,1})) \wedge (id_2 \Rightarrow (x^0 \in \mathcal{D}_{0,2})).$$

After a refinement, the CONTINUE() command at line 23 of INCSOLVE restarts the solving loop from step $i = 0$. Accordingly, one of the identifiers id_1 and id_2 is selected, and the computation of refined over-approximation starts. Note that not id_1 and id_2 but id_0 may be selected because a search along a different path may be still on the way.

4.4 An Example

We describe how the proposed method verifies the hybrid system in Example 1. Here, we change the initial domain to $(p, \gamma, c) \in [-1, 0] \times [\pi/6, \pi/4] \times [0]$. Parameters are set as $r = 2$ and $\omega = \pi/4$. Computed domains for p along the time line are illustrated in Figure 4. Enumeration of refined initial domains and decisions on transitions are illustrated in Figure 5.

The computation proceeds as follows:

- a. At line 10 of INCSOLVE, the initial state `go_ahead` and the initial domain $\mathcal{D}_0 = ([0, t_{max}], [-1, 0], [\pi/6, \pi/4], [0])$ is activated using the SAT solver (we denote \mathcal{D}_0 by $\mathcal{D}_{0,0}$ in the following, where the identifier for (refined) domains is subscripted). Then, HCSPROPAG constructs HCSs with respect to the state `go_ahead` and the transitions from `go_ahead` to `left_border` and `right_border`. By solving these, HCSPROPAG




Fig. 4. Process of solving the car steering example. The horizontal line at $t = 0$ denotes the initial domains for p . The vertical lines are the boundary values at the discrete state transitions. In (a), the p component of the domain is divided into two ($\mathcal{D}_{0,1}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{0,2}$). In (b), the γ component is divided ($\mathcal{D}_{0,3}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{0,4}$). Bending lines show the results of numerical computation using the boundary values of the initial domain.




Fig. 5. Enumeration of possible execution paths. Enumeration starts from the upper-left of the figure. A simulation from an initial domain proceeds horizontally as directed by the arrows. Each node is a tuple of a result of evaluating a guard constraint, a domain satisfying the guard constraint, and the next state to transit. Refinements of the initial domains are shown by the identifier numbers directed by the dotted arrows.

computes the results $\{(false, \mathcal{D}_{1,0}, \text{left_border}), (false, \emptyset, \text{right_border})\}$. Since all the results contain *false*, the algorithm refines $\mathcal{D}_{0,0}$ to $\mathcal{D}_{0,1}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{0,2}$ by dividing the component $[-1, 0]$ for p into $[-0.5, 0]$ and $[-1, -0.5]$.

b. Afterward, HCSPROPAG computes the result $\{(true, \mathcal{D}_{1,1}, \text{left_border})\}$ from $\mathcal{D}_{0,1}$. INCSOLVE proceeds to step 1 of the execution, and HCSPROPAG com-

putes the results $\{(false, \mathcal{D}_{2,0}, \text{in_canal}), (true, \mathcal{D}_{2,1}, \text{correct_left})\}$ from $\mathcal{D}_{1,1}$. Since $\mathcal{D}_{2,0}$ is returned with *false*, $\mathcal{D}_{0,1}$ is refined into $\mathcal{D}_{0,3}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{0,4}$ along the component for γ , i.e., $[\pi/6, \pi/4]$ into $[\pi/6, 5\pi/24]$ and $[5\pi/24, \pi/4]$. The algorithm also computes the execution path that moves to *correct_left* at step 2, and reaches *straight_ahead* at step 3.

c. From $\mathcal{D}_{0,2}$, the algorithm is still unable to decide whether the transition to *left_border* may be enabled or not. The algorithm applies another refinement.

d. From $\mathcal{D}_{0,3}$, the algorithm computes the results without the guarantee of existence, as in the computation from $\mathcal{D}_{0,1}$. Note that the path to *straight_ahead* is not computed here again, since the existence of this path is learned in Step b.

e. Finally, from $\mathcal{D}_{0,4}$, the algorithm computes a counter-example guaranteed to reach *in_canal* at step 2.

5 Implementation

We built a prototype implementation called *hydlogic* of the method described in this paper. *hydlogic* is implemented in OCaml, C, and C++, and consists of about 2000 lines of code. Input to *hydlogic* is a textual description of a hybrid system. *hydlogic* translates an input model into a formula as explained in Section 3. Then, the core component checks the satisfiability of the formula by the method in Section 4. *hydlogic* integrates the following external solvers.

- The Decision Procedure Toolkit (DPT) [7] is used as an incremental SAT solver. DPT is an implementation of a DPLL-based SAT solver in OCaml. It has a flexible API for adding clauses incrementally and controlling search procedures.
- We use the implementation described in [11] for solving HCSs. The HCS solver is built on top of Elisa [8], an interval-based constraint solver based on box-consistency, and VNODE-LP [13], which handles initial value problems for ODEs based on interval arithmetic. The whole system is implemented in C++.

6 Experiments

We present results of experiments on three examples. It shows how the complexity scales by the unrolled execution steps, the size of models, and the size of boxes given by initial constraints. We also compared the tool with HSolver [15] and PHAVER [5]. We experimented on a 2.4GHz Intel Core 2 Duo processor with 4GB of RAM.

6.1 Car Steering Problem

Consider the car steering problem given in Example 1. We first analyzed the unsafety of the model as described

in Section 4.4. `hydlogic` took 692.74 seconds and 1716 times of refinements to prove the existence of a counter-example. We set the minimum width w_{min} of the initial boxed values to 0.05, and the time domain $\mathcal{D}.1$ in the HCSs to $[0, 3]$.

We then modified the guard constraint for the edge entering `in.canal` as $p = 2$, and analyzed the model again. `hydlogic` returned the result `Unknown` in 91.88 seconds. Refinements were done 48 times. The result was `Unknown` because it was unable to prove the existence property for some of the guard constraints and the initial values. For example, when the initial domain for p was $[0, 0.05]$, the existence of a solution to the guard constraint of `left.border` was not proved. We confirmed that all the evaluation of the transition to `in.canal` had no solution.

We tried to solve the same instance of this problem by `HSolver` but the computation did not terminate after 10 minutes (though `HSolver` could solve another instance of the problem).

6.2 Navigation Benchmark

We present results of the navigation benchmark problem taken from [5, 15]. This problem models an object at a position $(p_x(t), p_y(t)) \in \mathbb{R}^2$ moving within a grid of $n \times n$ areas of size 1×1 ($n \in \mathbb{N}$). Each area in the grid determines the velocity $(v_x(t), v_y(t))$ of the object as

$$(\dot{v}_x(t), \dot{v}_y(t))^T = A \cdot ((v_x(t), v_y(t))^T - v_d), \text{ where}$$

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} -1.2 & 0.1 \\ 0.1 & -1.2 \end{pmatrix}, v_d = (\sin(i \cdot \pi/4), \cos(i \cdot \pi/4))^T.$$

$i \in \{0, \dots, 7\}$ is determined by each area. The lower left corner area of the grid has the coordinate $(0, 0)$. We used

a map specified by the following matrix $M = \begin{pmatrix} \text{U} & 2 & 4 \\ 4 & 3 & 4 \\ 2 & 2 & \text{U} \end{pmatrix}$,

where `U` denotes an unsafe region, and the other numbers indicate the values i of the corresponding areas. We set the initial discrete state as the $(1, 2)$ area in the grid, and set the initial values as $(p_{x,0}, p_{y,0}, v_{x,0}, v_{y,0}) \in [0, 1] \times [1, 2] \times [0.5] \times [0]$.

We analyzed the reachability to the unsafe areas using `hydlogic`. Parameters are set as $k = 4$, $w_{min} = 0.25$, and $t_{max} = 10$. We proved the existence of a path from the initial state, where $(p_{x,0}, p_{y,0}) \in [0.25, 0.5] \times [1.5, 1.75]$, to the unsafe area at $(3, 3)$. The analysis took 60.1 seconds and 34 refinements.

We then modified the initial condition for p_y to $p_{y,0} \in [1, 1.5]$, and tried to find an execution path reaching to the unsafe area at $(1, 1)$. We analyzed for $k \in \{2, \dots, 7\}$ and each computation returned `Unknown` because there were some guard constraints not guaranteed to be satisfied. We confirmed those guard constraints are not for the boundary of the unsafe area. The computation took

37.93, 40.33, 43.46, 70.37, 70.36, and 70.38 seconds, respectively.

`PHAVer` can check the safety of several instances of this problem [5]. An advantage of `hydlogic` is that it can prove the existence of a path reaching the goals specified as unsafe areas. As previously experimented [15], `HSolver` could not solve this problem.

6.3 Tunnel Diode Oscillator Circuit

The third example taken from [5] models an RLC circuit involving a tunnel diode. The two dimensional continuous state $(i, v) \in \mathbb{R}^2$ expresses the current i through the inductor and the voltage drop v of the tunnel diode. The vector fields are specified as in the original paper. We describe the model as a hybrid system, where each discrete state corresponds to an equation for i_d . In the experimentation, we unrolled the model for 7 steps and tried to find a path. We set the initial constraint as taking q_3 for the discrete state, and $(i, v) \in [0.0006] \times [0.45]$ for the continuous state. `hydlogic` computed an enclosure of a path with the guarantee of the existence. It took 4332 seconds. Most of the CPU time was spent by `VNODE-LP` to solve the ODEs because `VNODE-LP` can only take small time steps (around 10^{-8}) in its iterative computation.

In [5], `PHAVer` took a model, which is linearized beforehand, and proved that the continuous state stayed within a certain region. `HSolver` also solved a reachability problem based on this example in a reasonable time [15]. Our method might solve reachable sets more efficiently by applying recent techniques for solving ODEs with uncertain initial domains. By detecting that a box enclosure of a state in an execution is included in the initial domain, we can verify the safety for the infinite steps.

7 Conclusion

We have presented the `hydlogic` tool for verifying systems that interact with physical environments. We provide `hydlogic` as an SMT-based tool that inter-works with an incremental SAT solver and an interval-based constraint solver.

`hydlogic` supports nonlinear hybrid systems (Definition 1) involving nonlinear ODEs and nonlinear guard constraints, which cannot be handled by the most of the available tools. The proposed method utilizes the property to guarantee the existence of a unique solution in an over-approximation provided by the HCS solver. The property is used to prune the search space in the proposed algorithms, as well as to output a set of boxes in which a counter-example of a model (or a path to the goal) is guaranteed to exist.

In this paper, refinement of an over-approximation is performed by simply dividing an initial box. The refinement method can be improved in several ways using techniques for handling nonlinear ODEs with uncertainties [14], for example.

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